Exploring the notion of a foundation in normative ethics and its implications for moral objectivity
In the realm of moral philosophy, the concept of a foundation has long been a subject of debate. While some argue that morality requires a solid grounding, others contend that it can exist without a foundation. This article delves into the philosophical sub-disciplines of normative ethics and meta-ethics to shed light on this contentious issue. Drawing from the author’s book “Pragmatist Quietism: A Meta-Ethical System,” we explore the idea that morality is objective but does not necessitate a foundation, presenting a fresh perspective on this complex topic.
The Illusion of a Foundation:
Normative ethics seeks to determine what is morally good or bad, independent of societal or personal beliefs. However, the notion of a foundation for morality has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Many individuals mistakenly conflate objectivity with cultural universality or innate principles. Some argue that morality requires a solid foundation to establish its legitimacy. Others attempt to find a firm grounding for morality. Yet, both perspectives miss the mark, as morality, in its entirety, exists without a foundation.
The Role of Foundations:
To understand the concept of a foundation, we must first distinguish it from a moral theory. Utilitarianism, for instance, explains right and wrong based on the promotion of overall well-being. While utilitarianism offers a comprehensive explanation, it is not a foundation. A foundation should support or justify moral theories and claims without being a claim within the realm of morality itself. Rather than offering direct explanations of what is right or good, foundations focus on the meaning of words and concepts or explore the metaphysical aspects of moral properties.
Exploring Possible Foundations:
One potential candidate for a foundation is the causal theory of reference, often used in the philosophy of language to explain how terms and concepts refer to objects in the world. Applying this theory to moral terms, we can argue that the concept of “good” refers to properties that causally regulate its usage. Another perspective, known as neo-Aristotelian naturalism, suggests that ethical features are part of the natural world, similar to well-functioning organs or biological processes. These theories, rooted in semantics and metaphysics, could serve as foundations for ethics by influencing which ethical claims are true. However, they remain irrelevant to fundamental ethics, as they do not address the specifically ethical value that drives moral debates.
The Fallacy of Foundations:
The inclination to seek a foundation for morality stems from a misunderstanding of normative-ethical disputes. Unlike ordinary factual disputes, these ethical debates do not aim to accurately represent the world. Instead, they revolve around motivations, emotions, and the significance of ethical values. While normative-ethical disputes matter, they lack the representational value found in factual disputes. Consequently, attempts to ground morality in metaphysics or semantics miss the mark, as they do not address the specific ethical value at the core of moral debates.
The Significance of Ethical Disputes:
Despite the absence of representational value, normative-ethical disputes hold significance due to their impact on motivation, affect, and ethical values. These debates matter because they shape our actions, guide our moral reasoning, and influence our perceptions of right and wrong. Unlike disputes such as the “squirrel” debate, normative-ethical disputes are not arbitrary and cannot be settled by conceptual fiat. They require rigorous argumentation and consideration of the specific ethical value at stake.
Redefining Ethical Truth:
Ethical truth, according to the author, lies in the realm of “specifically ethical value.” This value arises from doing the right thing for the right reason, rather than accurately representing the world. It is not a matter of mirroring reality but of aligning actions with ethical principles. By embracing a values-first approach, known as pragmatism, we can reframe ethical truth, objectivity, and knowledge within a comprehensive framework that encompasses various domains of inquiry. Pragmatism offers a way to make sense of ethical truth without relying on a foundation in a supposedly more fundamental area of study.
Conclusion:
The search for a foundation in normative ethics has long captivated philosophers, but it remains an elusive concept. This article has explored the idea that morality can exist without a foundation, challenging traditional notions of moral objectivity. By understanding the unique nature of normative-ethical disputes and the significance of ethical values, we can redefine ethical truth within a pragmatic framework. Ultimately, the absence of a foundation does not undermine the validity of morality but instead invites us to explore the complexities of ethics in a new light.
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